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The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 altered the 
nature of European politics almost overnight. As Soviet and 
then Russian political influence in Central and Eastern 
Europe rapidly receded, the countries there were left to 
direct their own political destinies and to develop their 
own arrangements for state security. As Europe's premier 
military organization, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) became interested in extending its 
sphere of influence into this region by inviting some 
Central and Eastern European states to join the Atlantic 
Alliance.
Although NATO successfully added the countries of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to its membership in 1997, 
there are still some who oppose NATO's expansion eastward. 
This study examines the thesis as posited by George F.
Kennan that the expansion of NATO is the most fateful error 
of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. The 
arguments supporting NATO expansion include the potential 
for increasing political stability and democratic reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe, aiding NATO in its transition 
from a strictly collective defense organization to a 
cooperative security organization with broad European 
security concerns including peacekeeping operations, and 
perhaps most importantly, aiding in the transition of 
Central and Eastern Europe into the greater European 
community.
The arguments against the expansion of NATO include the 
problem of antagonizing a politically unstable Russia, the 
problem of consensus, and the problem of exclusion.
Following an analysis of both sides of the issue, the final 
chapter includes a review of the study as well as 
predictions for NATO's future role in European security. An 
expanded membership contributes to NATO's metamorphosis into 
an organization with broad European security concerns and 
offers the best chance for unity in Europe.
11
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Plan of Study
Following the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe at 
the end of the Second World War, another adversary 
appeared out of the east to challenge the political and 
military supremacy of the United States and Western 
Europe. Once an ally of Great Britain, France, and the 
U.S., the Soviet Union emerged from the turmoil of the 
Second World War as the greatest power in Asia and 
Europe and, arguably, a world superpower second only to 
the United States.̂
When Germany surrendered on May 7th, 1945, the 
Soviet Red Army occupied much of Eastern Europe 
including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and roughly one third of Germany.“ 
With the large, battle-hardened Soviet army directly to 
the east of them, many Western European nations became 
nervous and suspicious about potential Soviet designs
1
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for a military invasion of Western Europe.
Responding to this perceived threat, on March 4, 
1948, representatives from several Western European 
countries met in Brussels to consider the development of 
a mutual assistance pact designed for the military and 
political protection of its members. The result of this 
meeting was the signature of the Brussels Treaty.̂ This 
treaty included Great Britain, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In addition to pledging 
the members to assist one another in the event of an 
armed invasion of one of the member countries, the 
Brussels Treaty also included a provision that the 
member states would agree to "build up a common defense 
system and to strengthen their economic and cultural 
ties.
It soon became evident, however, that the Brussels 
Treaty would be insufficient to deter effectively a 
potential Soviet military threat. The five signatories 
realized that to guard against Soviet aggression, a 
common defense treaty organization would necessarily 
have to include a North American component--namely the 
United States. Talks about the inclusion of the United
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
States and Canada into a possible European security 
organization ultimately culminated in the signature of 
the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949.^
Originally, the North Atlantic Treaty providedf
little in the way of an organizational framework for 
military operations. The "organization" suffix became 
more realistically applied as the member states of the 
North Atlantic Treaty effectively rallied to carry on 
the Berlin Airlift and field forces in the Korean War, 
after which point the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) became 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
NATO, as a military alliance originally formed to 
deter the Soviet Union from expanding militarily and 
politically into Western Europe has, on the whole, been 
a resounding success.̂  Indeed, NATO managed to "win" 
the Cold War without ever firing a shot. Shortly after 
the creation of NATO and its subsequent expansion to 
include the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet 
Union and the "satellite" nations of Eastern Europe 
formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). What soon 
developed was a Cold War between rival alliances that 
lasted until the Soviet collapse in 1991.
\
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From its creation until the end of the Cold War, 
NATO succeeded in achieving its mission by preventing 
Soviet expansion. In considering the history of NATO's 
creation, purpose, and recent political developments, it 
becomes clear that with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, NATO has lost the impetus for its original 
mandate--or its "raison d'etre." Furthermore, many 
argue that in developing a new mandate for NATO, the 
organization should expand to include new member-states.
The impact that enlargement will have on NATO as 
well as the European community is worth scholarly 
consideration for two principal reasons. First, as 
Europe's premier selective defense organization, its 
internal stability and cohesion can have important 
positive or negative consequences for the security of 
Europe. Second, NATO's viability as an effective 
selective defense organization— with which the issue of 
enlargement seems inextricably intertwined--may also 
prove to be vitally important to the progress of 
democratic and capitalist reforms in the recently 
independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
It is the purpose of this study to test the thesis 
posited by George F. Kennan that "NATO enlargement would 
be the most fateful error in American policy in the 
entire post-Cold War era."'
Critics of NATO enlargement cite several reasons 
for their position. One reason asserts that expansion 
into Eastern Europe by admitting former Warsaw Treaty 
Organization states serves to foment renewed distrust 
between Russia and the NATO member-states. Second, the 
exclusion argument states that by admitting some Eastern 
European states and not others, the political stability 
of the region may potentially be damaged. Third, by 
increasing its membership, NATO may have a more 
difficult time reaching consensus on courses of action.
Advocates of NATO expansion argue that adding new 
members will help to stabilize the political environment 
in Eastern Europe by helping to incorporate the newly 
sovereign countries there into the larger European 
community. In this regard, enlargement provides these 
states military security not necessarily afforded them 
from other organizations such as the United Nations or 
the European Union. Furthermore, the proponents of this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
argument point out that NATO's credibility as an 
international organization allows it to serve as an 
effective peacekeeper as it moves from a strictly 
selective defense organization to a cooperative security 
organization.®
In order to explore the arguments surrounding the 
issue of NATO enlargement, it will be necessary to 
examine the historical, political, economic, and 
military foundations for these arguments by examining 
the mission of NATO leading up to, and following, the 
end of the Cold War in 1991. Furthermore this study 
explores, through review of literature, the development 
of new missions and future responsibilities for the 
Alliance.
In examining the arguments for and against 
enlargement, it is necessary to qualify the difference 
between what is good for the Alliance, and what is good 
for Europe and European security. By asserting that 
enlargement is preferable or not preferable, we may 
assess the merits of the arguments based on their impact 
on political, economic, and military factors, as well as 
how these factors affect the Alliance versus greater
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Europe.
NATO's Theoretical Basis
Collective Security 
Prior to the First World War, the international 
community operated under a system known as the balance 
of power system. Under this system, nation states 
formed short alliances during conflicts to preserve a 
perceived balance of power among nations— in effect, to 
preserve the status quo. During the Napoleonic Wars in 
the first years of the 19th century, French aggression 
was perceived by most of Europe as a threat to the 
balance of power among European states. Consequently, 
Great Britain and other nations banded together to 
prevent France's domination of Europe. From the 
Napoleonic Wars to the First World War, the system 
worked well and prevented any major outbreaks of war in 
Europe.
However, by the end of the First World War, the 
states of Europe recognized that the balance of power 
system was no longer effective in preventing major 
conflicts. The result was the articulation of the idea 
of collective security as represented by the creation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the League of Nations. Collective security is designed 
to prevent aggression through the threat of combined 
action on the part of a community of nations.®
According to political scholar Inis Claude, the 
designers of collective security envisioned a system 
which;
...involved the establishment and operation of a 
complex scheme of national commitments and 
international mechanisms designed to prevent or 
suppress aggression by any state against any 
other state, by presenting to potential 
aggressors the reliable promise of effective 
collective measures, ranging from diplomatic 
boycott through economic pressures to military 
sanctions, to enforce the peace.
The proponents of collective security argued that the
problem was that the balance of power system fostered
the creation of competing military alliances that were
often unknown to states not party to the alliance.
Indeed, the First World War is frequently cited as an
example of the dangers of a balance of power system.
Forward-thinking political philosophers like Thomas
"Woodrow" Wilson and Immanuel Kant believed that a
system of collective security would best promote
peaceful coexistence among nations. Although the League
eventually failed, the subsequent United Nations (UN)
8
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serves as a good example today of a collective security 
organization.
The problem of establishing a peaceful interna­
tional order in Europe has been present since the 
breakdown of the feudal system and the emergence of the 
modern Westphalian system of nation-states.^" Although 
the term "collective security" is an early twentieth 
century invention, the central concept has been 
advocated since the beginning of the modern state 
system. In the words of political observer Martin 
Wight :
By collective security we mean a system in which 
any breach of the peace is declared to be of 
concern to all the participating states, and an 
attack on one is taken as an attack on all. It 
is amusing and at the same time sobering to 
reflect that this system was written into the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, and endlessly 
discussed and refined for the next 15 years, 
without any suspicion... or knowledge on the part 
of Woodrow Wilson, or the League of Nations Union 
that it had been tried repeatedly in 
international history since the fifteenth 
century.
Wight uses as examples of these early collective 
security organizations the Most Holy League of Venice in 
1454, the Treaty of London in 1518, the Association of 
the Hague of 1681-83, and the Quadruple Alliance of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1718. The collective security system is founded in an
aspiration to think of interests beyond those of the
nation and its allies and to consider those of the
international society as a w h o l e T h e r e  is inherent
in the idea of collective security a sense of
involvement in the fate of others. Author and
philosopher John Donne noted in Meditation XVII that,
...no man is an Island, entire of it self; every 
man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the 
main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe 
is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as 
well as if a manor of thy friends or of thine own 
were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am 
involved in Mankind; And therefore never send to 
know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for 
thee.
The characteristics of universality present in 
collective security organizations have frequently made 
them ineffective in dealing with political and military 
conflicts. Although political philosophers like Kant 
believed that the only remedy for war and international 
lawlessness was a system of international right founded 
upon public laws conjoined with power to which every 
state must submit, the most recent incarnations of 
collective security such as the League of Nations and 
the United Nations have often proven unreliable in
10
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dealing with regional security concerns.
Selective Security 
While the United Nations serves as an excellent 
forum within which member states may openly discuss 
matters that are of concern to them, and although this 
function does much to foster the advancement of peaceful 
coexistence among nations, the United Nations has 
historically been unable to deal effectively with many 
regional security concerns. The inability of the United 
Nations to combat "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans 
during the 1990s is evidence of collective security's 
inadequacy as a framework for a military alliance.
As a result of collective security's frequent 
ineffectiveness in preserving local and regional peace, 
many nations have found it necessary to form security 
organizations with a more regional, narrow scope, and 
with limited membership. Such international 
arrangements represent what are known as selective 
security organizations. NATO is a manifestation of this 
type of security organization. Formed under the 
auspices of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
which ensure the right of nations to create regional
11
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organizations for collective self-defense and the 
regional resolution of disputes, NATO is essentially a 
regional, selective security organization dedicated to 
preserving peace in the North Atlantic region of the 
world.
On a theoretical level, selective security 
addresses one of the fundamental problems with the 
practical application of collective security. One 
political scholar posited the problem of regional 
conflict prevention as such:
...as long as the primary political units of 
world society are nation states, determined to 
protect their independence above all other values 
except physical survival and run by leadership 
groups accountable to domestic interests ahead of 
world interests, no member nation of an 
international collective security association 
will participate in actions likely to put its 
independence and domestic interests at risk 
unless such participation is clearly required to 
protect these interests.
In the more regionally-oriented selective security
organization, the focus is generally more narrowly
defined, and a common enemy is firmly designated. While
a collective security organization is typically
dedicated to universal security for all, selective
security is dedicated to security only for its members.
12
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Summary
As earlier noted, selective security organizations 
such as NATO are frequently defined by the common enemy 
against whom the member states are generally united 
against. With the collapse and disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the common enemy that had once unified the 
NATO member states has disappeared- NATO leaders are 
now left with a dilemma--what should the new purpose of 
NATO be, and should NATO admit new members to achieve 
this goal?
For the purpose of answering the question posed 
above, this paper is divided into four parts. Chapter 
Two is an historical summary which examines the roots of 
distrust which developed between the United States and 
Soviet Union long before the onset of the Cold War.
This account goes on to examine the events of the Second 
World War that are relevant to the formation of two 
opposing geopolitical camps following the end of the 
war. It is important to understand these forces as they 
helped to create the political environment that gave 
birth to selective security organizations like the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty
13
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Organization. This part also includes an outline of the 
organizational structure of NATO--as familiarity with it 
is important to understanding many of the arguments both 
for and against enlargement.
Chapter Three of this study articulates and 
examines the arguments in favor of NATO enlargement. As 
the arguments in favor of NATO enlargement are numerous, 
only the most prominent of them are examined here. Such 
arguments stress the importance of NATO as a successful 
security organization and include the idea that NATO can 
serve as a broader security framework for all of Europe 
and, furthermore, that the states of Eastern Europe 
would more rapidly be brought into the European 
community through membership in NATO.
Chapter Four examines the arguments against NATO 
expansion. These arguments are largely based upon the 
assumption that NATO's mandate will remain similar to 
that which it has had for more than fifty years--solely 
the defense of its member states from aggressive 
neighbors. The most prominent among the arguments 
against NATO expansion is the Russian position on NATO 
enlargement- Just as the Soviet Union strenuously
14
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objected to the creation of NATO in 1949, Russia also 
vehemently opposes enlargement— particularly the 
inclusion of those nations of the former Warsaw Treaty 
Organization.By expanding to include nations like 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, NATO creates 
renewed animosity between historic rivals. Furthermore, 
the two issues of expansion at the cost of efficiency 
and expansion at the cost of exclusion are similarly 
addressed.
In the final chapter, this study speculates as to 
the future of the North Atlantic Alliance as it 
searches for a new role and strives to adapt to the 
changes that enlargement is sure to have for it. While 
political observers may debate the pros and cons of 
enlargement, it is fruitless to speculate seriously 
about the future of an un-enlarged NATO--for enlargement 
has happened and future enlargement seems a foregone 
conclusion. Therefore, addressing the arguments against 
enlargement in this study is an exercise, to some 
extent, in prediction. As political observers 
experience the world with a new and enlarged NATO, some 
arguments contained herein may bear fruit, and others
15
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may not.
16
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Two Great Developing Nations
The history of NATO and the political forces that 
gave it birth go farther back than the actual signature 
of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Specifically, a 
cursory examination of the relationship between 
Russian/Soviet and American histories offers a great 
deal of insight into the development of the Cold War and 
the subsequent creation of NATO and other selective 
security organizations. Perhaps the first person to 
predict that conflict could one day develop between the 
United States and Russia/Soviet Union was the French 
political observer Alexis de Tocqueville. As far back 
as the early nineteenth century, de Tocqueville noted 
the potential power and ideological differences 
developing between the two nations. As noted in his 
classic examination of U.S. political culture, Democracy 
in America, de Tocqueville states that,
19
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[there] are at the present time two great nations 
in the world, which started from different 
points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I
allude to the Russians and the Americans...
[their] starting-point is different, and their 
courses are not the same; yet each of them seems 
marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the 
destinies of half the globe.^
In discussing the histories of the two nations, de
Tocqueville is brief, but he does point out several
important differences between the United States and
Russia. One of the most interesting of these
differences is the manner in which the two countries
have related with foreign nations during their history.
While the people of the United States were 
geographically isolated and free to pursue a "manifest 
destiny" with great personal freedom and "rugged" 
individualism, the Russian people were bordered by 
numerous hostile nations and have been forced to develop 
with a political solidarity and unity that enabled them 
to defeat their numerous adversaries.
In fact, the Russian people have been invaded 
during the last two hundred years by the French, the 
Japanese, the Germans (twice), the British, and the 
United States. Much, of Russian and Soviet history is a
20
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history of warfare.̂
The Formation of Two Can^s
As the First World War dragged on in 1917, as a 
result of the Russian withdrawal, much of Kaiser Wilhelm 
II's army was now diverted to the Western Front. With 
over one million new troops heading for France, the 
Allies were in desperate need of military relief. One 
of the proposed solutions to this military dilemma was 
the re-opening of the eastern front from which Russia 
had withdrawn following the communist revolution and the 
signing of the Brest-Litovsk pact with Germany. This 
pact turned over to Germany one quarter of Russia's 
people, almost all of its arable land, and most of the 
industrially rich areas of the country.^
The British, Americans, and French, fearing that 
the new German troops from the eastern front might break 
through the western line, resolved to involve themselves 
in the Russian revolution on the side of the Tsar's 
White armies. In doing so, approximately 12,000 
American troops in addition to British troops invaded 
the area of North Russia around Archangel and Murmansk. 
Fighting in this arena continued well past the armistice
21
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which ended the WW I, and into 1919 and 1920.
Ultimately unsuccessful in their attempts to re-install 
Tsar Nicholas II, the Western forces retreated and left 
the Soviet Union in 1920.^
This little-talked about episode of American/ 
Russian history offers one historical reason why the 
Soviet Union developed a distrust of the West by the end 
of the Second World War. When this 1918 invasion is 
considered together with the French invasion in the 
early 19th century and the hugely destructive invasion 
by Germany in WWII, it becomes easier to understand why 
the Soviet Union distrusted the nations of the West-- 
particularly the United States.
In addition to Russia's turbulent history replete 
with memories of invasion, events at the end of WWII 
also contributed to feelings of distrust by the Soviet 
Union toward the United States. As described by 
political revisionist historian Gar Alperovitz, 
immediately after the death of U.S. President Franklin 
Roosevelt, President Harry Truman learned of the 
imminent testing of a nuclear device. As WWII came to a 
close, and the political fate of many Eastern European
22
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nations was to be decided at the Potsdam Conference, 
President Truman assumed a less cooperative position 
relative to the Soviet Union regarding issues of 
political influence in Eastern European nations 
following the war.^
As chronicled by Alperovitz, Truman was reluctant 
to negotiate any arrangements until the atom bomb had 
been tested, so that he might politically bully the 
Soviets from a position of superior military strength.® 
The conclusion that Alperovitz reached is that there 
were political as well as military reasons for the use 
of the atom bomb on Japan in concluding WW II. 
Essentially, it was believed by the Soviets that the 
United States, by using the bomb, endeavored to 
intimidate them in order to gain greater influence at 
the negotiating table when the political fates of 
Eastern European nations were to be decided at the 
Potsdam Conference- For all the mentioned reasons, the 
Soviet Union felt politically and militarily insecure 
following WW 11.^
During the years between 1945 and 1949, faced with 
the need for economic and political reconstruction as
23
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well as military protection, Western European countries 
and their North American allies became concerned with 
the expansionist capabilities and ambitions of the 
Soviet Union. Having fulfilled the purpose for which 
they were intended, the armies of the Western European 
powers were rapidly demobilized following the war. When 
it became apparent that the Soviet leadership had no 
intention of reducing the size or scope of the Red Army, 
Western European leaders became alarmed.®
Furthermore, given the nature of the Soviet 
Communist Party ideology and its call for a global 
revolution of the proletariat, it became clear that the 
integrity of politically weak European nations— namely 
those occupied by the Red Army in Eastern Europe— may be 
compromised by an aggressive Soviet Union. The 
subsequent imposition of undemocratic forms of 
government in many Eastern European countries added to 
these fears.
One of the most visible factors that led to 
political tension between the Soviet Union and the 
United States was the conflict over Eastern Europe.®
The most important issue here was the fate of Poland,
24
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and indeed the Polish question dominated relations 
between the Soviet Union and the western powers at the 
beginning of 1945; Poland was far more important to both 
sides than any other of the Eastern European countries.
It was the invasion of Poland that finally prompted 
France and Great Britain to declare war on Germany in 
1939. Moreover, Poland formed the path by which Germany 
invaded Russia and the Soviet Union in WW I and WW II. 
Political hegemony in Eastern Europe was important to 
the Soviets not only to provide a buffer zone between 
themselves and the West, but also to serve as the 
Soviets' own path to invade Germany should they again 
have reason to fear German power.
The Soviet Union needed both the right of passage 
through Poland as well as secure lines of communication. 
If Poland were allowed to be independent, or even worse 
come under the influence of the West, such rights could 
not be secure. By the start of 1945, the thrust of 
Soviet policy seemed clear to the Western allies. The 
Soviet Union, in spite of vociferous objections from her 
Western allies, recognized the communist-dominated
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Lublin Coiranittee as the provisional government of 
Poland.
The Making of the NATO system
By 194 9 Europe was divided between East and West. 
Each side had organized its part of Germany and had 
incorporated it into its bloc. This division of Europe 
into two camps did not, however, lead to a stable 
peace. It was not enough for the two sides simply to 
accept things as they were. The Soviets, clearly 
interested in the question of German power, believed 
they had the right to take any measures necessary to 
protect themselves, while the British and Americans felt 
it necessary to retain some influence in Poland and 
other Eastern European countries, as the Berlin Blockade 
by the Soviets and the subsequent Berlin Airlift by 
Western powers in 1948 amply demonstrate.
By 194 9, the balance of power shifted away from the 
West when the Soviet Union successfully exploded an atom 
bomb. While the Soviets had long enjoyed a clear 
superiority of ground forces in Europe, the Western 
allies had been able to counterbalance this superiority 
with their possession of nuclear weaponry. With the
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
breakup of the Anglo-American nuclear monopoly, the 
Soviets were now in a much better position to accept a 
political and even military showdown with the West/- 
In fact, Stalin was quoted in October of 1950 as saying 
that the United States, "was not prepared at the present 
time for a big war."̂ -'' The general consensus in the 
east was that if war is going to happen, let it happen 
now.
The western powers were then faced with a serious 
problem. The military weaknesses now so obvious to 
western military planners in the light of Soviet nuclear 
technology led them to conclude that Western European 
military buildup was necessary. In short. Western 
Europe would have to be defended on the ground, and a 
military alliance would be necessary to accomplish such 
a buildup.
The Structure of NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) of April 1949-- 
which is the legal and binding basis for the alliance-- 
was created within the framework of Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent 
right of independent states to individual or collective
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defense. As the preamble to the Treaty states, the aim 
of the Allies is to "promote peaceful and friendly 
relations throughout the North Atlantic Area."^^
However, at the time of the Treaty's conception, the 
immediate purpose of NATO was to deter the Soviet Union 
from expanding militarily and politically into Western 
Europe.
In order to understand the arguments surrounding 
the question of NATO enlargement, it is important to 
develop an understanding of how NATO operates. The 
principal decision-making and administrative bodies of 
NATO include the North Atlantic Council, the integrated 
military command structure, the secretary general, and 
the various committees of NATO.
The North Atlantic Council 
The North Atlantic Council is the only body within 
the Alliance that derives its authority expressly from 
the North Atlantic Treaty and is the highest decision­
making body in the organization. The Council, which 
meets once a week in regular session, has effective 
political authority within the organization and is 
composed of representatives from each of the member
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States, known as Permanent Representatives.
The North Atlantic Council serves the important 
role of providing a forum within which the NATO members 
are able to express their concerns. Permanent 
Representatives act on instructions from their capitals, 
and act to inform or explain the views and policies of 
their governments to their colleagues around the council 
table. Conversely, the representatives report back to 
their governments the views and opinions expressed by 
other governments."*" As NATO is an example of an 
intergovernmental institution, each member retains full 
sovereignty and responsibility for its own actions.
When decisions are made by the Council, consensus is 
required for collective action; simple majorities 
obtained through formal voting procedures are not used.
The Council, in addition to its duties as the prime 
decision-making body of the alliance, has an important 
public profile as it issues declarations and communiques 
explaining NATO policy to the general public as well as 
to the governments of countries which are not members of 
NATO.
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The Secretary General 
The Secretary General is a senior international 
statesman nominated by the member governments as 
Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, the Defense 
Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group, and 
as Secretary General and chief executive of NATO. The 
Secretary General is responsible for promoting and 
directing the process of consultation and decision­
making throughout the Alliance. He has the authority to 
propose topics for discussion and decision and possesses 
a good measure of influence in settling disputes between 
member states.
In addition to his position within the alliance, 
the Secretary General is the principal spokesperson for 
the Alliance in its external relations.
The Integrated Military Structure 
The Integrated Military Structure provides the 
means by which the member countries provide for their 
common defense. All nations opting to become members of 
the military part of NATO contribute forces which 
together constitute the integrated military structure of 
the Alliance. In accordance with Article 5 of the North
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Atlantic Treaty, the integrated military structure 
provides the organizational framework which allows the 
member countries to defend themselves against threats to 
their security or stability.
Under the present arrangement, the forces within 
the military command structure are organized into three 
main categories: Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces, 
Main Defense Forces, and Augmentation Forces. Each of 
these categories is designed to combat specific types of 
threats to NATO security.
In addition to the organization of military forces 
on a function-basis, NATO military command structure is 
further divided into two geography-based theatres of 
operation: Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied 
Command Atlantic (ACLANT). The position of Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is located at the top 
of the command hierarchy. The SACEUR is responsible for 
the security, peace, and territorial integrity of the 
European member states. In addition to these 
responsibilities, the SACEUR is also spokesperson for 
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
To this end, the SACEUR has direct access to the Chiefs
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of Defense and the Heads of Government of NATO member 
countries.
Allied Command Europe (ACE) is charged with 
safeguarding the area extending from the northern tip of 
Norway to Southern Europe including the Mediterranean, 
and from the Atlantic coastline in the west to the 
distant eastern border of Turkey. Responsible for the 
security of over three million square miles and a 
population in excess of 320 million people, ACE has 
divided military operations into three categories 
including Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST) , 
responsible for Norway and the United Kingdom, Allied 
Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), responsible for the area 
south of AFNORTHWEST to the southern German border, and 
Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), charged with 
the security of Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Mediterranean 
Sea, the Sea of Marmara, and the Black Sea. The 
region of AFSOUTH is separated from AFCENT by the non- 
NATO member countries Switzerland and Austria.
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) is headquartered 
in Norfolk, Virginia, U.S.A. ACLANT extends from the 
North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal
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waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa, 
including Portugal, with the exception of the English 
Channel which remains the purview of ACE.
NATO History from 1949 to Present
Between 1947 and 1949 a series of dramatic 
political events brought matters to a head. These 
events included direct threats to the sovereignty of 
Norway, Greece, Turkey, and other Western European 
countries, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, and the 
illegal blockade of Berlin which began in April of the 
same year. The signature of the Brussels Treaty of 
March 1948 marked the determination of five Western 
European countries--Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--to develop a common 
defense system and to strengthen the ties between them 
in a manner which would enable them to resist political, 
military, and ideological threats to their security.
Negotiations with the United States and Canada 
subsequently followed regarding the establishment of a 
single North Atlantic Alliance based on security 
commitments and mutual guarantees between the nations of 
Western Europe and North America. Denmark, Iceland,
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Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited by the Brussels 
Treaty powers to become active participants in this 
process. These negotiations culminated in the signature 
of the Treaty of Washington on April 4, 1949, bringing 
into being a common security system based on a 
partnership among the countries of the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Iceland, and 
Portugal.These twelve countries came to form the 
"original" NATO. In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to 
the Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany joined the 
Alliance in 1955, and in 1982, Spain also became a 
member of NATO.
The North Atlantic Alliance was founded on the 
basis of a Treaty between member states entered into 
freely by each of them following open debate and 
parliamentary process. The Treaty upholds their 
individual rights as well as their international 
obligations in accordance with the Articles 51 through 
54 of the United Nations Charter.
The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) commits each member 
country to sharing the risks and responsibilities as
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well as the benefits of selective security. The
greatest difficulty in negotiating the NAT was finding
an exact formula that would satisfy the European desire
for a U.S. commitment sufficient to deter Soviet
aggression, yet flexible enough to allow the United
States time to deliberate prior to entering any
conflict. Eventually the agreement stated that,
[the] Parties agree that an armed attack against 
one or more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of 
the right of individual or collective self- 
defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, will assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with other Parties, 
such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area
This was a revolutionary commitment from the United
States in view of its political traditions of
isolationism and avoidance of "entangling alliances"
during peacetime.
At this time, the North Atlantic Treaty was nothing 
more than a document pledging mutual defense. It took 
the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June of 1950 
to "put the ' O' in NATO— that is to persuade the Allies
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to organize an integrated military command structure in 
peacetime and to establish the presumption of a large, 
long-term U.S. military presence in Europe"^^
The invasion of South Korea had direct relevance 
for Western forces in Europe as many Western states 
believed the Korean invasion to be a Soviet stratagem. 
Specifically, military advisors saw the communist 
invasion of South Korea as a possible prelude to armed 
invasion of Western Europe. The response by NAT powers 
was swift and decisive. In December of 1950, General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had served as the Supreme 
Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe in 
1944-45, was appointed the first Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (SACEUR). In April 1951, Allied 
Command Europe (ACE) became operational, with the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at 
Roquencourt, near Paris.
The German Problem 
The United States was, however, not satisfied with 
bearing so much of the security burdens in Europe. 
Specifically, the United States proposed that the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) develop an
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independent military force capable of shouldering some 
of the security burden. Although West Germany had been 
established as a state in 1949, it had only been given 
conditional sovereignty and was still under an 
occupational regime.
The U.S. proposal for West German armed forces met 
some resistance. The terrible memories of WW II had not 
faded, and many within the Alliance were hesitant to 
allow the rearmament of Germany. Although the strategic 
reasons for the creation of such a force were perfectly 
logical given the potential for Soviet aggression in 
Europe, the French sought to impose severe restrictions 
on such forces through a counterproposal which called 
for the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC). 
As French leaders vowed never to accept "the creation of 
German divisions," they instead proposed that German 
forces be "organized into battalion units of about 1,000 
men" to be distributed throughout the proposed European 
army. This proposal eventually faded away when an
alternate framework for the establishment of West German 
forces was devised.
The French eventually lost their argument. In
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1954, at meetings held in Paris, a series of agreements 
was reached regarding the status of West Germany.
First, the agreements normalized relations between the 
NATO allies and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or 
West Germany). Second, the occupational regime then 
being imposed upon the FRG was officially terminated.
The Paris agreements also recognized the FRG as a fully 
sovereign state, and finally, the FRG was invited to 
join NATO as a full member.
In 1954, West Germany was admitted to the Western 
European Union (WEU) together with Italy and the 
original Brussels Treaty signatories. West Germany 
renounced the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons on its territory, and accepted various 
restrictions on its conventional armaments. With 
assurances from the United States, Canada, and Britain 
to maintain air and land forces in West Germany, France 
finally agreed to West Germany's admittance into NATO 
which finally occurred in 1955.
The Warsaw Treaty Organization 
In response to the West German induction into NATO, 
the Soviet Union signed the Warsaw Treaty in 1955,
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thereby creating the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). 
The WTO included the Eastern European countries which 
came to be known as Soviet "satellite" nations. These 
countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany (granted technical independence by the 
Soviet Union in December, 1955), Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania. Although the WTO was a military alliance 
directed toward the NATO member countries, the creation 
of the WTO served to counterbalance NATO militarily and 
politically. A rough balance in European politics soon 
emerged which would last until the Soviet collapse in 
1991
The French Withdrawal 
Responding to a dissatisfaction with U.S. nuclear 
policy, and domination of the NATO military command 
structure, French President Charles de Gaulle officially 
withdrew French forces from the integrated military 
command structure in 1956. Moreover, the French 
requested that all American nuclear weapons, NATO 
installations and facilities, be removed from French 
soil. While the French remained a part of NATO in 
virtually all other aspects, its withdrawal from the
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military command structure did have significant combat 
readiness consequences. For example, by removing NATO 
installations from French soil, lines of communication 
and supply were weakened, requiring that more resources 
be moved farther east and closer to the front. The 
French withdrawal also had the effect of requiring more 
support from the United States, and further required 
that West Germany play a more significant role in NATO's 
military readiness.
Detente
Relations between the Soviet Union and the Western 
democracies relaxed during the Nixon administration. 
During this time, many political observers were asking 
questions similar to those that would come after the 
Soviet collapse in 1991. Specifically, many were 
questioning the purpose of NATO during a period of 
detente between the East and West. In response to this 
concern regarding NATO's future, the North Atlantic 
Council commissioned a year-long study to examine the 
future tasks of the Alliance which came to be known as 
the Harmel report.
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The Harmel report provided for two essential 
functions of the Alliance. First, the Alliance was to 
"maintain adequate military strength and political 
solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of 
pressure and to defend the territory of member countries 
if aggression should occur.Further, the report also 
created a new function which stated that NATO was "to 
pursue the search for progress towards a more stable 
relationship in which the underlying political issues 
can be s o l v e d . B e c a u s e  this report addressed issues 
both of military preparedness as well as the political 
gap between the East and the West, its adoption provided 
the foundation of NATO's subsequent efforts in arms 
control negotiations.
As arms control and reduction efforts realized 
success, and the nuclear options available to NATO were 
voluntarily reduced, NATO came to be increasingly 
dependent upon conventional forces. With the increasing 
reliance on conventional forces, the strength of NATO 
placed greater responsibility on the European member 
states.
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The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 has led NATO 
to assume a somewhat different role in European 
peacekeeping.^^ Specifically, the fall of communism was 
perhaps nowhere more violent than in former Yugoslavia, 
where NATO eventually became involved.
The Balkans and NATO as Peacekeeper 
NATO's first major statement on the civil war in 
Yugoslavia, in November 1991, gave no indication that 
the conflict would lead to Operation Joint Endeavor, 
which NATO defense Ministers in June 1996 called "the 
largest and most complex operation NATO has ever 
undertaken, a mission to help bring peace and stability 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina,"^^ Originally, the NATO 
countries expressed their "deep concern"^^ over the 
bloody events unfolding there. Over the course of time, 
however, NATO determined that it must take a more active 
role in the Balkans in order to preserve European 
security.
It was not until the middle of 1992 that NATO began 
to assume peacekeeping responsibilities in the former 
Yugoslavia. By the end of the same year, NATO in 
cooperation with the Western European Union (WEU), was
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enforcing the UN economic sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro, as well as the general arms embargo against 
the entire Yugoslav area. This effort came to be 
known as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) .
During the period between 1992 and 1995, the 
Alliance made decisions that led to naval operations, in 
cooperation with the WEU, to monitor and later to 
enforce the UN embargo in the Adriatic. NATO operations 
there began with monitoring the UN no-fly zone over 
Bosnia, as well as the ultimate implementation of air 
strikes to break the siege of Sarajevo and other areas.
Summary
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, created by 
political and cultural forces that began well prior to 
the end of the Second World War, has been a successful 
selective security organization. Throughout the intense 
years of the Cold War during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
the years of detente in the late 1960s and through the 
1970s, and into the political turmoil associated with 
Mikhail Gorbachevas policies of glasnost and 
perestroika, NATO successfully provided for the security 
of its member states.
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In assuming a new role of European peacekeeper, and 
for a variety of reasons that this study later 
discusses, NATO has determined that an increased 
membership will best facilitate the achievement of 
NATO's goals. While NATO enlargement has already 
happened with the 1997 admittance of Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, and though further enlargement 
seems a forgone conclusion, this policy of enlargement 
has critics. Although the Cold War is over and peace 
seems to have arrived in most of Europe, NATO may be 
creating new problems with which it must deal.
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CHAPTER III 
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF NATO EXPANSION
Most propositions for the enlargement of NATO find 
legitimacy in the fact that NATO is a successful 
international collective defense organization.^ Indeed, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is widely 
regarded as one of the most successful collective 
defense organizations ever created. As previously 
discussed, NATO was established in 1949 for the purpose 
of containing Soviet military and political expansion 
into Western Europe. Since that time and up to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO successfully 
served that purpose.
In discussing the arguments in favor of NATO 
expansion several are seen as the most prominent. It is 
believed by many that enlargement of NATO to include 
Eastern European nations will promote democratic reform 
and stability there, provide stronger collective defense 
and an improved ability to address new security
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concerns, improve relations among the Eastern and 
Central European states, foster a more stable climate 
for economic reform, trade, and foreign investment, and 
finally, improve NATO's ability to operate as a 
cooperative security organization with broad European 
security concerns. In short, proponents of NATO 
expansion like former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright argue that, "the new NATO can do for Europe's 
east what the old NATO did for Europe's west: vanquish 
old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure 
environment for prosperity, and deter violence."" The 
proposed duties of NATO listed above are important 
because they would take care of problems which have 
risen only recently and as a direct result of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.
As the Cold War ended, the political atmosphere of 
Europe changed almost overnight. As unpopular communist 
regimes were swept away after four decades of Soviet 
oppression, "[all] of Eastern Europe, millions 
demonstrated their great joy and jubilation."’ With the 
absence of Soviet hegemony, the fixed bi-polar 
arrangement of political power shared by the Soviet
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Union and the United States was replaced by a very 
unstable multi-polar political environment with many 
separate nations each pursuing separate national 
interests. The importance of the Soviet collapse 
relative to the political stability of Central and 
Eastern Europe is not to be underestimated. ̂ With the 
absence of Soviet power in the region, ethnic strife 
once again resurfaced in these countries.' While the 
division of Czechoslovakia proceeded in a peaceful 
manner, the breakup of Yugoslavia violently illustrates 
one of the impacts that Soviet disintegration has had on 
the region. Similarly, the breakup of the Soviet Union 
into separate republics had much the same effect. In 
many of the newly independent republics— particularly 
the Baltic states--Russians now found themselves to be a 
persecuted minority.^
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Soviet 
disintegration can be found in the formulation of NATO 
policy. With the disappearance of its raison d'etre, 
some argued that NATO was no longer necessary. Others 
argued that NATO should continue operating the way that 
it had been since 1949, and still others believed that
49
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
NATO might begin to assume new roles in the security of 
Europe. In developing new schemes for the security of 
Europe, NATO leaders (particularly the Germans and the 
Americans) eventually decided that enlarging NATO by 
adding new member states offered the best possible 
solution to the problem of a purpose for NATO, as well 
as a solution to the problems of political turmoil being 
experienced by the newly sovereign countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe previously controlled like political 
marionettes from the Kremlin.
Predictions of the demise of the North Atlantic 
Alliance abounded in the years immediately following the 
end of the Cold War. Most academics inclined toward the 
tenets of political realism were predicting that, 
without the threat that led to its creation, NATO would 
crumble and eventually wither away.̂ While NATO's 
future is still seen by some to be uncertain, it seems 
safer to say that NATO will not continue to exist after 
the Cold War in the same way that it did during the Cold 
War. Specifically, some believe that the Alliance will 
become something more than a mere selective defense 
organization.
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The logic of admitting new member states into NATO 
finds basis in the fact that it is now assuming a very 
different role than the one performed during the Cold 
War. Although the Alliance is still, at heart, a 
selective defense organization, it is also transforming 
into what is now being called an organization of 
'^cooperative security".^ Specifically, political 
observer Allen G. Sens argues that NATO is indeed 
undergoing a transformation from a collective defense 
organization to a cooperative security organization.
Collective defense efforts are typically formed to 
"protect their members from a specific military threat 
to their territorial sovereignty. Such arrangements 
are therefore exclusive, and are directed against 
threats that are outside the membership of the alliance 
With the absence of the Soviet threat, many believed 
that NATO's collective defense arrangement might give 
way to a return to the balance of power system in 
Europe. This scenario was considered by many to be a 
political nightmare, as such a security system would 
inevitably lead to a renationalization of defense 
priorities among the countries of Europe.
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Since the Soviet collapse, NATO has been searching 
for ways to fill this new role. While the Alliance 
seems to be far more than a collective defense 
organization, it is also not quite a true collective 
security organization. Nor has NATO yet become the 
basis for a new "concert of Europe." According to 
political scientist Allen G. Sens of the University of 
British Columbia, the most apt description for NATO 
seems to be that of a cooperative security organization. 
While collective defense and collective security are 
narrowly defined terms, cooperative security is broader 
and more encompassing.
Cooperative Security 
According to Sens, cooperative security is 
described by six main points. First, cooperative 
security organizations are based on reassurance and 
engagement, rather than deterrence and containment. As 
such they are inclusive and aim to incorporate like- 
minded nations into a larger political framework.
Second, the primary activities of cooperative security 
are not directed against a specific external threat, but 
rather exist for the achievement of shared security
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objectives. Third, cooperative security is built on a 
broad conception of security in order to promote 
military and non-military objectives. Fourth, 
cooperative security is aimed at transforming and 
adapting existing security arrangements to fit the needs 
of the day. Fifth, cooperative security prefers to 
establish the conditions under which improvised, 
informal, and flexible patterns of cooperation can 
develop consistent with existing or traditional 
modalities and sensibilities. Last, cooperative 
security recognizes the value and importance of other 
bilateral or multilateral security arrangements in the 
maintenance of regional security.
As Sens goes on to point out, NATO's actions since 
the end of the Cold War indicate that it has in fact 
come to exhibit many of the features of a cooperative 
security organization. According to Sens, NATO is "now 
in the business of projecting security and stability 
through an elaborate process of political engagement and 
military cooperation with non-member states.
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The process of extending security and stability 
began, for example, with the "hand of friendship" 
extended to Central and Eastern European countries in 
the London Declaration of June, 1990. Furthermore, NATO 
also announced in the Copenhagen Declaration a year 
later that any coercion aimed at Central Europe would be 
of direct and material concern to the Alliance. At 
the Rome Summit of November, 1991, NATO announced a new 
strategic concept that no longer recognized the former 
Warsaw Treaty countries as enemies, it de-emphasized the 
importance of nuclear weaponry, and no longer spoke of 
"threats" to security but rather of "risks" to 
stability. In short, this shift in NATO policy 
represented an "explicit recognition by NATO of the 
existence of a broadened security agenda.
With the assumption, by NATO, of this new role in 
European security, many argue that the addition of new 
member states enhances the organization's ability to 
achieve its new goals. Specifically, many believe 
that NATO can be used as a tool to incorporate Eastern 
European countries into the overall European community. 
Furthermore, NATO could also be used as a military tool
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to maintain peace in the Balkans and other areas of 
Europe. Indeed, NATO^s interest in Central and Eastern 
Europe following the end of the Cold War was undoubtedly 
driven by a desire to extend stability into a 
politically tumultuous region of Europe.̂ *"
According to many political observers, the best way 
to encourage stability in East Europe is for NATO to act 
as an exporter of Western European political values to 
Eastern Europe.
Why Not Enlarge the EU Instead?
Many opponents of NATO enlargement propose that it 
is not NATO that should be enlarged for the purpose of 
greater European stability, but rather that the European 
Union ought to serve this purpose. Central Europeans do 
not see the two organizations as alternatives, but as 
complementary. While some traditionally neutral nations 
like Sweden, Finland, and Austria have chosen membership 
in the EU, but opted out of NATO membership, most 
Central and Eastern European nations see dual membership 
in these organizations as perfectly logical given that 
most of Europe considers NATO and the EU to be the main 
institutions of Western security. In short. Central and
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Eastern Europeans are unlikely to be satisfied with EU 
membership alone.
According to Jane M.O. Sharp, three main reasons 
account for Central and East European dissatisfaction 
with EU membership by itself. First, unlike the 
European neutrals who have opted out of NATO membership, 
especially Finland and Sweden, which undertake 
substantial investments in military forces to make their 
neutrality credible, none of the Central European 
countries can afford similar investments. Rather, these 
countries recognize that they need to pool their 
military resources to provide for a credible security 
posture.
Second, Central Europeans find it difficult to see 
the EU as providing "anything more than economic 
security given the EU"s failure to mediate the crisis in 
the former Yugoslavia in 1991-1992."^® A third problem 
seen by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is 
that joining the EU means turning one's economic 
structure and legal system upside down to become 
compatible with other EU members.
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Moreover, Central and Eastern European nations also 
point out that the standards for EU admittance are much 
higher than those for NATO membership. In addition to 
the NATO requirements of democracy, rule of law, human 
rights, and the protection of minorities within the 
society, EU membership additionally requires a fully 
functioning market economy able to withstand the market 
forces present within the EU. The EU also requires that 
"its members adhere to the aims of political, economic, 
and monetary union; and they must adjust their 
administrative structures to make them compatible with 
those of the other EU members. Nations seeking NATO 
membership instead of, or in addition to, EU membership 
point out that even though the Swedes engaged in a rapid 
program of EU compliance, it still took five years for 
them to achieve full compliance.
Benefits for Eastern Europe 
Many scholars assert that the enlargement of NATO 
will help to promote democratic reform and peaceful 
coexistence between the nations of Eastern and Central 
Europe. While there are certainly arguments that assert 
the reverse which will be discussed in the subsequent
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chapter, many argue that NATO enlargement is likely to 
ensure continued democratic reforms within the countries 
seeking membership in the Alliance. Because most every 
nation of Eastern and Central Europe actively seeks 
Alliance membership, the pursuit of the requirements for 
NATO membership have very significant implications for 
the European community as a whole. If only a few 
European countries were seeking membership NATO's impact 
on the region would not be nearly so important.
When NATO admitted Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic 1997, it did so because those countries had 
achieved a certain level of political and military 
achievement which corresponded with the prescribed NATO 
standard. Specifically, in order to be seriously 
considered for membership, the applicant countries had 
to achieve genuine pluralistic democracy, develop market 
economies, as well as demonstrate a healthy respect for 
the rule of l a w . W h i l e  few would argue that such a 
process will be trouble-free, it is nevertheless a goal 
that Eastern European countries should strive for.
In attempting to be admitted to NATO, countries are 
required by the Alliance to pursue democratic reforms.
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Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry laid out
a five point plan to which aspiring NATO members would
have to adhere in order to be considered for membership
in the Alliance. Points four and five of his outline
said the following:
[potential] new members must uphold democracy and 
free enterprise, respect human rights inside 
their borders, and must respect sovereignty 
outside their borders. Fifth, their military 
forces must be under democratic, civilian 
control.
In short, pursuing NATO membership has encouraged 
many Central and Eastern European nations to put aside 
their differences and work towards greater freedom 
within their borders. Specifically, some have 
accelerated civilian controls over military forces; 
others have peacefully settled long-standing disputes 
over minority rights and borders. In January of 1997, 
the Czech government gave a formal expression of regret 
for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia 
in 1945 and 1946, Similarly, over a number of years 
Hungary and Romania transformed their relationship with 
each other, as did Romania, Ukraine, and, to a lesser 
extent, Hungary and Slovakia.
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Moreover, the Polish government sacked a general in 
1997 who was unwilling to accept civilian control over 
Polish military forces. The Baltic states of Latvia and 
Estonia, who have historically had problems dealing with 
their Russian minorities have, in recent years, softened 
their attitudes and policies toward them.
While many of these reforms have undoubtedly been 
enacted in order to curry favor with the West, they are 
nonetheless real advances for liberal democracy in these 
countries. Many of these countries, however, feel as 
though Western governments keep moving the goal posts 
farther and farther away from full membership in the 
"Western club" by continuously raising standards. It 
then becomes incumbent upon the nations of the West to 
offer some type of truly achievable goal as incentive 
for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to 
continue democratic reforms.
Benefits for NATO and the West 
Aside from the benefits that democratization offers 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Sharp 
asserts that stability in Eastern Europe helps to ensure 
stability in Western Europe and other areas.
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Specifically, she points out that today, the nations of
Western Europe would never consider settling their
disputes via military means, and Western Europe has
consequently experienced political and military
prosperity since the end of WW II. She further argues,
as do most statesmen and national leaders, that this is
the state of affairs that greater Europe should strive
to achieve. As German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe put
it in October of 1993, "[if] we don't export stability
we shall import instability."^^ In the final analysis
... a wider alliance is but a means to the end of 
building confidence and security toward which all 
of NATO's directions are aimed. In an era of 
profound transformation in transatlantic and 
European security, there can be no guarantees 
that the values and strategic outlook of the 
Alliance can form the foundation for all of 
Europe. Nevertheless, we do know that the NATO 
experience has much to offer as we return to the 
original broad ambition of NATO and embrace a 
wider community of free peoples.^®
NATO enlargement may also prevent the 
renationalization of military programs in the newly 
sovereign nations of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Renationalization is, in fact, something that concerns 
both Central and Eastern Europe as well as Western 
Europe and the United States. Serbia's recent efforts
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to assert political hegemony over areas of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is just one example of this phenomenon. If 
NATO continues to expand to include new members in 
Eastern Europe, it seems unlikely that these nations 
would feel politically compelled to pursue their own 
independent security arrangements. According to 
political analyst Jeffrey Simon in his article, "Does 
Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," the denationalization of 
defense policies has been one of NATO's greatest 
successes.̂ '
Denationalization is the process whereby a 
country's defense policy is openly shown to its allies, 
thereby preventing insecurities from arising among 
neighbors."^ Should NATO not enlarge to include new 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe, or worse 
still wither away into non-existence, many believe that 
countries may re-nationalize their defense policies 
resulting in the renewal of old suspicions,^® The fears 
of renationalization are particularly problematic to the 
neighbors of the newly reunified Germany considering the 
history of German military aggression. Renationaliza­
tion could also pose significant problems
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for relations between current Alliance members Greece 
and Turkey given their historically tumultuous 
relationship with one another.
In addition to preventing the renationalization of 
defense policies of the member states of NATO, the 
Alliance framework has provided an excellent means by 
which the members themselves have peacefully settled 
disputes. In the British/Icelandic "cod-war" of the 
1970s, it was NATO's general secretary Joseph Luns who 
successfully mediated a resolution to the dispute. 
Similarly, membership in NATO has nominally helped Spain 
and Great Britain resolve their differences regarding 
claims of sovereignty over Gibraltar. Although these 
political problems held great importance to the 
countries involved, they pale in comparison to the 
acrimony that has dominated relations between Greece and 
Turkey for the last forty years. Indeed, all-out war 
has, on numerous occasions nearly erupted between these 
two co u n t r i e s W h i l e  NATO has certainly done little 
to address the sources of the strife between Greece and 
Turkey, their membership in the Atlantic Alliance has at 
least prevented full-blown war from breaking out between
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the two countries.
As events in the former Yugoslavia amply 
demonstrate, there is great potential for serious 
political and military turmoil in Central and East 
Europe. If NATO's success in preventing all-out war 
between Greece and Turkey is any indication, it seems 
likely that the incorporation of Central and East Europe 
into the NATO family of member states can only improve 
the political stability of the region.
The Russia Factor 
While the Russian reaction to NATO enlargement has 
generally been very negative as will be thoroughly 
discussed in the following chapter, some believe that 
NATO may again be called upon to act as a check upon an 
expansionist Russia. Specifically, although the Russian 
reaction to NATO enlargement is generally cited as one 
argument against the expansion of NATO eastward, some 
believe that NATO ought to use this opportunity to gain 
a stronger strategic advantage in Europe. In short,
NATO should take full advantage of Russia's present 
political weakness in order to ensure a stronger 
position for NATO in the event that conflict again
6 4
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develops between Russia and the West.
Summary
In developing for itself a new role in European 
security which some have called cooperative security, 
NATO is transforming itself into something more than a 
mere collective defense organization. In assuming this 
role, NATO has expressed its concern for the stability 
of Central and Eastern Europe, and committed itself to a 
strong involvement in the region.
For many political observers, NATO can best 
encourage political stability in Central and Eastern 
Europe by bringing these states into the NATO family.
As NATO looks forward to another fifty years, it seems 
likely that it will continue to expand as it sees such 
expansion to be the best bet for continued Western 
European prosperity, continued political and economic 
reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and the 
development of a greater European security community.
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CHAPTER IV 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST NATO EXPANSION
As Europe emerges from the political turmoil of the 
Cold War, it is re-evaluating its established security 
arrangements. The most powerful and important of these 
arrangements for the countries of Western and Central 
Europe is arguably the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Pursuant to developing a new 
security arrangement for Europe, NATO solicited 
applications from European countries for NATO membership 
beginning in the middle 1990s. For a variety of 
reasons, NATO member states believe that enlargement 
through the addition of new member states is the best 
possible way to achieve NATO's security objectives.^
The arguments against the enlargement of NATO are 
equally numerous as those in favor of enlargement.
NATO's history as a premier selective defense 
organization, according to many political observers, is 
no justification to transform it into a larger, more
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United Nations-style international organization. They 
argue that to redefine the role of NATO to something of 
this nature is to invite almost certain disaster. As 
George F. Kennan noted in a recent interview, "the 
enlargement of NATO would be the most fateful error in 
American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.""
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the major 
arguments against the expansion of NATO. In treating 
this issue, we can see at least three major reasons that 
support a non-expanded NATO: Russia will be antagonized, 
exclusion of some countries in Eastern Europe may 
destabilize instead of stabilize the region, and 
finally/ the addition of new member states may prevent 
NATO from taking the swift and decisive actions that 
have, for more than fifty years, been largely 
responsible for the successful security of its member 
states.
The Russia Factor
From the end of the Second World War to its 
collapse, the Soviet Union played a major role in the 
politics of the countries of East and Central Europe.-
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Soviet/Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe began to end, 
however, when Mikhail Gorbachev instituted his policies 
of glasnost and perestroika in the 1980s, and officially 
when the Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 31, 
1991/ As this influence over Eastern Europe has 
continued to disappear for the Russians, the West has 
begun to extend its sphere of influence into this area.
When the West first began contemplating NATO 
enlargement in 1993, Russia seemed likely not to pose 
any serious objections, as it was mostly inward-looking 
and pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy often dubbed 
"Atlanticism"." Since this time, however, the situation 
has changed. The Russian Republic has replaced 
Atlanticism with "statism". Statism is a policy whereby 
the national interests of a state— in this case Russia—  
are afforded greater importance than those interests of 
the regional or world community. This is a pragmatic 
approach to foreign policy that relies on traditional 
methods of diplomacy and mechanisms of power.
Evidence of this switch in policy orientations can 
be seen most notably in the rhetoric of the Russian 
leaders, the writings of security experts, and the daily
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conduct of Russian government in Eurasia, Europe, and 
elsewhere.̂ While this new policy does not necessarily 
mean that Russia is again pursuing imperialistic 
interests, it does mean that Russia is developing a 
strategic identity and seeking to elevate itself to 
regional power status. In keeping with the theory of 
political realism as posited by Hans J. Morgenthau, 
former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has said 
that "a state is not rewarded for doing what is right, 
only what is necessary to survive."^
The changes that statism has brought to the 
expression of Russian foreign policy have roughly 
manifested themselves in two political arenas. In 
Europe, Russia is pursuing greater reintegration with 
western neighbors Belarus and Ukraine through the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)— very much like 
an Eastern European Union. In East and Central Europe, 
Russia is vehemently opposing any enlargement of NATO 
that would exclude it. In short, Russia is endeavoring 
to assert its influence in a politically neutral Eastern 
Europe before it becomes too attached to the West.® As 
it seems likely that statism will remain a key feature
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of Russian policy for the near political future, further 
NATO enlargement will undoubtedly cause further tension 
between Russia and the West.
As Russia endeavors to create a stable regional 
system by imprinting its authority in Eurasia and 
East/Central Europe, its goals are likely to come into 
conflict with those of the West.
Plagued by economic, political, and social turmoil 
associated with the changeover from a communist to a 
free-market capitalist state, Russia has become 
politically weak in the international community, and it 
feels that the West's efforts to enlarge NATO by 
admitting former Soviet ally states is exploiting 
Russian political weakness at the cost of Russian 
security.®
Although NATO leaders assert that Russia has 
nothing to fear from NATO enlargement, Russian leaders 
continue to be concerned.No issue is more central to 
NATO's goal of building a peaceful political order in 
Europe than relations with Russia. The issue of NATO 
enlargement is best examined from six distinct 
perspectives. These perspectives, which will be
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discussed later in the chapter following a broad 
overview of the Russian reaction to NATO enlargement 
include the following: the U.S. position of what 
Russians should think about NATO enlargement, what 
Russians profess about NATO enlargement, Russian 
participation in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) ,
Russian views on the possible admittance of former 
Soviet republics to NATO membership, Russian-NATO 
deliberations about terms for future relations, and the 
possibility of Russian membership in NATO. In order to 
understand fully these perspectives, however, it is 
first necessary to review briefly the course of Russian 
politics since the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Since the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, Russia 
has undergone intense political turmoil and has, at 
certain times, assumed very different political faces.
An examination of these various political trends affords 
political observers insight to understanding the issues 
surrounding Russians reaction to the enlargement of 
NATO.
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The Russian Response To NATO Enlargement
As the Warsaw Treaty Organization began to 
disintegrate during the years of 1989 to 1991, many 
Soviet officials believed that NATO, as well, would soon 
fade away. Eduard Shevardnadze, then the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, declared in September of 1990 that, "in the 
future NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization will 
become component parts of all-European security 
structures and later will probably be dissolved in 
them."^" Other officials went on to say similarly that 
the U.S. military presence--and above all the nuclear 
presence--would not remain long after the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.
This assumption by Soviet and later Russian leaders 
has, however, been proven incorrect. Although Soviet 
troops were officially withdrawn from Germany by 1994, 
the United States" military presence remains. Soviet 
assumptions regarding the demise of NATO seemed to have 
been misplaced partly due to a false sense of WTO/NATO 
parallelism. In effect, they assumed that the WTO 
equated NATO, and that without one, the other would 
crumble. The equation of the WTO with NATO proved to be
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a rather spurious one, as it grossly underestimated the 
strength of the foundations of NATO. While the WTO was 
a creation of Soviet military and political influence 
that was inspired in a "top down" manner, NATO had been 
created a full six years prior to the WTO, and done so 
in a voluntary manner. While the states of the WTO were 
ostensibly forced into the organization and could not 
get out (with the exception of Albania in 1968), the 
North Atlantic Treaty was a purely voluntary agreement 
arrived at by fully sovereign states,
The failure of NATO to disintegrate as the Soviet 
Alliance did in the early 1990s in itself caused much 
consternation among Russian officials. As is outlined 
in the following section, the subsequent growth of NATO 
as a successful international organization has created 
significant political problems for the Russians, and for 
the West, as they relate to Russia in the post-Cold War 
world.
Atlanticism & Statism
Following the Soviet collapse and the breakup of 
the empire in 1991, the new republic of Russia looked to 
the West for economic and political assistance. To this
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©nd/ Russian politicians assuin©d a vary accomniodating 
political position relative to the West. This political 
and diplomatic position came to be known as 
"Atlanticism." Originally coined by Russian Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozerev, the term "Atlanticism" refers 
to a two-part Russian foreign policy. Essentially, 
Atlanticism calls for Russia to do two things: work to 
establish good relations with the countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) , and second, to 
pursue the establishment of good relations with the 
West.
Kozyrev, and other likeminded Russian leaders 
believed that only by forming close ties with the West 
would Russia be able to overcome the imperial and 
authoritarian legacy of tsarist Russia to truly become a 
democratic and "westernized" country. Only by joining 
the West and becoming like the West, would Russia ever 
be able to rise to a position of political influence 
again.
Although Kozyrev's position did reflect a general 
consensus regarding Russian policy, his views about an 
Atlanticist foreign policy were not shared by everyone.
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Specifically, a growing number of Russian politicians 
began to think in "more calculating terms.Vladimir 
Lukin, then ambassador to the United States, represents 
one member of a school of thinkers that began to place 
Russian interests more directly above those of the 
European or world community. In 1992, Lukin published 
an article in the U.S. journal Foreign Policy that 
expressed a far more guarded Russian political/ 
diplomatic position. In this article, he firmly 
endorsed Russian cooperation with the United States and 
West, but did so more for reasons based on political 
realism than political idealism.
This shift in Russian policy represents the shift 
from Atlanticism to a new kind of policy called 
"statism." The shift to a statist foreign policy 
represented a major shift in the orientation of Russian 
foreign policy. Unlike the Atlanticist emphasis on 
regional and international community concerns, statism 
is far more concerned with the achievement of goals 
which offer specific benefit to the state. Statism 
focuses on the internal integrity of the state. This 
type of policy judges international ventures based upon
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their benefit to the nation. Looking outward, it seeks 
a secure environment that will allow the state to live 
safely and prosper; as such it often aspires to dominate 
the areas near its borders and to exert influence even 
farther out.
By 1993, it had become apparent that a potential 
partnership between Russia and America would take a 
backseat to the pursuit of separate, and at times 
competing, interests. The formal proclamation of this 
new statist position came in Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin's 1993 State of the Union speech to the Duma and 
the Federation Council when he asserted that Russian 
foreign policy would be based on the protection of 
Russian national interest— even when that interest 
competed with the West. He further warned of a "Cold 
Peace" if Russia's interests were trampled by the 
West.
Russian Acquiescence 
and the Permanent Joint Council (PJC)
Pursuant to the new statist policy of "Russia 
first," Russian leaders vehemently opposed the 
enlargement of NATO to include the countries of the
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former Warsaw Treaty Organization. While enlargement 
became fact with the 1997 accession of Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
Russians did obtain what they felt to be significant 
concessions from the West.
Specifically, the year 1997 saw the creation of the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The Council 
was officially established by the Founding Act, signed 
by the NATO Allies and Russia on May 27, 1997, in 
Paris.*® Under the terms of the Act, the PJC brings 
together representatives of the nineteen Allies and 
Russia and provides a venue for consultation and 
cooperation regarding political and security matters. 
While Russian leader Boris Yeltsin claimed that the 
Founding Act offered significant concessions by the 
West, including a commitment not to allow former Soviet 
republics into NATO, United States President Bill 
Clinton claimed that the Founding Act and the creation 
of the PJC have given Russia only a voice, and not a 
vote.
The result of the Founding Act is ambiguous, as 
both sides claim political victory. Most political
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scholars believe that the Act simply means that the two 
sides have agreed to disagree.
The Six Perspectives
As outlined earlier, the issue of NATO enlargement 
and the Russian reaction to enlargement is perhaps best 
examined from six distinct perspectives. These 
perspectives include the following: First, the U.S. 
position of what Russians should think about NATO 
enlargement, second, what Russians profess about NATO 
enlargement, third, Russian participation in the 
Partnership for Peace (PFP), fourth, Russian views on 
the possible admittance of former Soviet republics to 
NATO membership, fifth, Russian-NATO deliberations about 
terms for future relations, and sixth, the possibility 
of Russian membership in NATO.
First, the United States has argued that NATO 
enlargement indeed serves Russian interests because it 
serves to prolong U.S. involvement in European affairs—  
thereby promoting the political stability of Eastern 
Europe, and ensuring that Germany remains committed to 
broader European security concerns instead of the 
pursuit of a separate national agenda. As former
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Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted, ''Russia, no
less than the rest of us, needs stability and prosperity 
in the center of Europe."^'
Albright and others have gone on to assert that
Russia should not view European freedom and security as
a zero-sum game in which,
Russia must lose if central Europe gains, and 
central Europe must lose if Russia 
gains...Russian opposition to NATO enlargement 
is... a product of old misperceptions about NATO 
and old ways of thinking about its former 
satellites in central Europe. Instead of 
changing our policies to accommodate Russia's 
outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's 
more modern aspirations.
Regardless of the problems associated with the Russian
response to NATO enlargement, U.S. officials have argued
that the Alliance cannot allow its growth to be
postponed or prevented by Russian opposition. To do so
would give the message that confrontation with the West
pays off.
Second, while U.S. and Western European leaders do 
much to emphasize NATO's role as a "whole European" 
collective security organization, Russia has had much 
difficulty reconciling with their perception of NATO as 
a Cold War machine devoted to containment of Russian
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power. To the Russians, enlargement is a policy 
"pregnant with d i s a s t e r . Rather than viewing NATO
enlargement as a harmless process dedicated to promoting 
stability throughout Europe, Russians continue to 
believe that enlargement is deliberately taking 
advantage of Russia's political weakness by extending 
the Alliance's sphere of influence
U.S. involvement through NATO is also seen by many 
Russians as proof that the United States is endeavoring 
to "impose an American-designed European security 
order.Furthermore, the relegation of Russian troops 
to de facto U.S. command in the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former 
Yugoslavia has been seen by many Russian military 
leaders as demeaning and humiliating— particularly as 
the United States has tended to favor the Muslim 
Bosniaks over the Slavic Serbs.
Moreover, Russians believe the most obvious problem 
with the enlargement of NATO is that it conveys a 
continued distrust of Russia by the West. As noted by 
one Russian official.
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...[the] Russophobia openly expressed by the 
Central and Eastern European leaders and the 
implied promise to expand NATO membership in the 
next round to countries bordering Russia strongly 
suggest that advocates of enlargement have a 
particular adversary in mind.
Such perceptions are particularly problematic
considering that the Alliance is essentially discussing
all matters of European security and is now unopposed in
implementing them. As Vladimir Lukin asserted,
...[we] all want European security. But if we 
are refused room [in NATO] we will have to worry 
about our own security...politically speaking an 
attempt is being made to kick Russia like a puppy 
out of the door of a room where questions of all- 
European security for the strategic future are 
being discussed. This kind of kick can trip you 
up yourself."'"
Third, the Partnership for Peace (PFP) , originally 
created in January 1994, offers NATO's partners the 
opportunity of cooperating with NATO in various programs 
and activities, including military exercises and civil 
emergency relief, as well as military operations such as 
IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia. By the end of 1996, the PFP 
had twenty-seven members including, but not limited to, 
Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Finland, 
Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Russia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Moldova.
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Russia's initial reaction to the PFP was positive 
when it was created in 1994, as the Russians believed 
that its creation would replace any plans for NATO 
enlargement. Accordingly, Russia's participation in the 
PFP was significant for the first year, particularly in 
programs related to civil emergency planning. Russian 
participation soon faded though, when Russian leaders 
came to perceive the PFP as a useless organization— that 
it would not even serve the purpose of postponing or 
preventing NATO enlargement.
Fourth, the most vehement objections voiced by 
Russian officials about the enlargement of NATO have 
been regarding the possible admittance of former Soviet 
republics to the Alliance. The Baltic republics of 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as well as Ukraine, for 
example, have expressed interest in becoming NATO 
members. While former Russian president Boris Yeltsin 
believed that the signature of the Founding Act in 1997 
included an indirect pledge by the United States not to 
include any former Soviet republics in subsequent waves 
of enlargement, Russians continue to doubt NATO 
intentions regarding this issue.
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While some contend that the Baltic republics of 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia might be added to the 
Alliance without severe Russian discontent, others 
believe that their admittance to NATO would cause 
catastrophic feelings of humiliation and outrage within 
Russia. To understand the potential for this reaction 
it is important to note how much Russia wishes to retain 
a politically neutral "buffer zone."^”̂ Should NATO 
choose to maintain an open-ended admission process, and 
initiate moves to admit former Soviet republics into the 
Alliance, many political observers warn that anti­
western voices in Russia could come to power and move 
Russia into a decidedly adversarial position relative to 
Western interests.
Fifth, despite the enlargement that NATO has 
ultimately undertaken. Alliance leaders have 
nevertheless endeavored to remain sensitive to the 
Russian desire to have input in decisions regarding 
European security. In 1996, for example, the North 
Atlantic Council reiterated its "commitment to a strong, 
stable, and enduring security partnership between NATO 
and Russia.""^ Former U.S. Defense Secretary William
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Cohen noted that when important security issues about 
Europe are being decided, it is important "to have 
Russia in the loop, and not out of the loop."-'°
The United States and other Western leaders also 
hope that NATO's continued efforts to include Russia in 
European security decisions will help to convince them 
of NATO's benign intentions. One of the most overt 
gestures to this end has been the reiteration by NATO 
leaders that they do not intend to alter NATO's nuclear 
deployment stance— specifically that they do not intend 
to deploy nuclear weapons on the soil of newly added 
NATO member states.
Sixth, one of the reasons for Russian opposition to 
NATO enlargement has been the tacit understanding that 
Russia is not being considered, by NATO, for Alliance 
membership anytime in the near future. It has, in fact, 
remained an unresolved question.
Although the new mission for NATO as the pan- 
European collective security organization does not, by 
definition, preclude the possibility of Russian 
admittance into NATO, the "Atlantic" nature of the 
Alliance would require a major revision if Russia were
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admitted. In the event of Russian admittance, NATO's 
military and political responsibilities would extend all 
the way to the Russian/Chinese border, and on to the 
Pacific Ocean something that the NATO member countries 
may not be entirely willing to do. Indeed, as former 
U.S. Secretary of State and eminent political scholar 
Henry Kissinger noted, "[no] European NATO country 
considers Russia's size, territorial extent, and distant 
non-European frontiers compatible with NATO 
membership.
The European members of NATO generally consider 
U.S. rhetoric that conceives of eventual Russian 
membership in NATO unwise. From the perspective of 
these states, three arguments against Russian membership 
stand out.
First, Russian membership may mean abandoning 
NATO's role as an instrument of collective defense and 
turning the Alliance into a very ineffective, and 
cumbersome security regime for the entire Eurasian 
region— not unlike a smaller, regionally-oriented United 
Nations. Second, Russian membership in NATO could upset 
existing patterns of influence in the Alliance, and in
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fact could render the European NATO members subordinate 
to a potential U.S.-Russia dyad of power. Last, if NATO 
retained its role as an instrument of collective 
defense, Russian membership would make the Alliance 
responsible for protecting Russia against China and 
other powers. Although the prospect of gaining Russia 
as an ally against China is appealing to many U.S. 
military strategists, such a pursuit is not of much 
interest to the European members of NATO.
In short, potential Russian membership in NATO 
offers some very interesting political dilemmas for both 
Russia and the NATO member states. While Russia would 
most likely welcome an invitation to join NATO, the 
Alliance seems unwilling to go so far at present. As 
Czech Republic president Vaclav Havel has said, "...an 
enlarged NATO should consider Russia not an enemy, but a 
partner...[but] Russia is nonetheless a Eurasian 
superpower, so influential that it is hard to imagine it 
could become an intrinsic part of NATO without flooding 
the Alliance with the busy agenda of Russian 
interests.
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Enlargement Perceived as a Russian Defeat
Irrespective of Russia's original and continuous 
objections to NATO enlargement, political observers can 
already see the damage that NATO enlargement has wreaked 
on relations between Russia and the West. Specifically, 
enlargement has created four major problems for future 
Russian political power in Europe and in the world.
First, enlargement has proven to be a disastrous 
defeat for Russian diplomacy. In spite of Russia's 
protestations and advancement of an alternate security 
organization called the Organization on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO has proceeded with 
its plan for growth through the addition of new members.
Second, NATO enlargement symbolizes Russia's 
sharply reduced influence in international affairs. It 
is the most visible sign of Russian decline, and 
essentially confirms the fact that Russia's political 
influence stops at the western Ukrainian border.
Third, enlargement signifies a defeat for Yeltsin's 
policy of engagement with the West. Originally seen as 
Russia's path to salvation, good relations with the West 
have not proven sufficiently fruitful in the eyes of
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Russian leaders. Indeed, Russians see NATO enlargement 
without their inclusion as a signal that they do not 
belong in the Western world. Such conceptions in Russia 
also tend to undermine efforts at Western democratic 
reforms.
Last, the growth of NATO would seem to signify a
defeat for Yeltsin's policies vis-à-vis the near abroad
and Eastern Europe. Following the breakup of the USSR, 
many Russian leaders felt that Russia would serve as a 
political and economic leader to the former WTO members 
of Eastern Europe in much the same way the United States 
interacts with Latin America. When such a relationship 
failed to develop, and Eastern European nations looked 
west instead of east for political and economic 
guidance, Russian pride suffered a severe blow. The 
last thing that anyone should want is a reawakening of 
authoritarianism in Russia and the development of a 
renewed adversarial relationship between the two 
countries "marked out by the will of heaven to sway the
destinies of half the globe.
The Problems of Consensus and Exclusion 
In addition to the significant problems surrounding
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Russia's reaction to the NATO enlargement, the addition 
of new member states also poses potential dangers for 
the cohesion of the Alliance itself. Furthermore, 
enlargement may also contain political risks for Central 
and Eastern Europe.
Exclusion
While many advocates of NATO expansion assert that 
the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe will help to 
foster the success of democratic regimes and promote the 
general political stability of the region, NATO 
enlargement thus far has only included a few select 
states in the region. Specifically, in 1997, the 
countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
were added to the NATO family. While this inclusion 
into NATO has undoubtedly allayed the security concerns 
of these three countries, other countries in the region 
have been excluded from the benefits of NATO membership.
Many political observers assert that NATO's success 
in promoting stability in Eastern Europe will depend 
greatly upon how the organization deals with and relates 
to the countries that have been denied membership. 
According to Ronald Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, two
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senior analysts at the RAND institute, how NATO handles 
the states excluded from membership will directly affect 
the stability of Europe. The authors contend that, if 
these countries feel "shut out, a destabilizing backlash 
could materialize, undercutting support for reform and 
strengthening nationalist forces within these 
countries.
Asmus and Larrabee further contend that if NATO is 
going to develop an attainable goal for European 
security, the issue of excluded nations will have to be 
sufficiently addressed. Managing NATO's enlargement 
process— particularly in defining the criteria so as to 
justify the choice of new members, to prevent 
destabilizing those not receiving invitâtions--is a 
major challenge. Perhaps the biggest fear of Central 
and Eastern European countries is that they will also 
not be invited to join the EU,
In short, how NATO and the West deals with the 
countries excluded from the first round of expansion 
will have a major impact on the political stability of
the region.
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Consensus
Although NATO seems, at present to be as 
politically healthy as it has ever been, many scholars 
believe that with the loss of its raison d'etre, NATO's 
future effectiveness may not long endure. Most scholars 
agree that much of NATO's success is at least partially 
attributable to the relative ease by which the member- 
states reach consensus. Specifically, it is pointed out 
that fear of Soviet aggression on the part of Western 
Europe ensured that NATO members were able to put aside 
their minor differences in order to agree on "big 
picture" issues
Just as the United Nations is widely regarded as an 
organization too large to take quick and decisive 
action--as was illustrated during the crises in the 
former Yugoslavia during the 1990s— critics of NATO 
enlargement contend that increasing the membership of 
NATO only serves to increase the likelihood that NATO 
will become too cumbersome to reach fast consensus and 
take decisive action.
According to political observer Anton Bebler, the 
decision-making capability of NATO could be seriously
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hampered by an increased membership particularly 
considering the great political differences that exist 
among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.̂ ®
Summary
Clearly the most important argument against the 
enlargement of NATO is the Russian reaction. While some 
argue that expansion now may provide NATO with an upper 
hand in a potential future conflict, most agree that the 
expansion of NATO without the actual inclusion of Russia 
into the Alliance simply increases the likelihood that 
such a conflict may, some day, occur.
Moreover, if NATO continues to expand, it risks 
becoming too large to operate with speed and precision—  
in short, it risks becoming a Euro-Atlantic United 
Nations. Last, while the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic has undoubtedly benefited these 
countries, those left out of the first wave—  
particularly Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic States 
are left to deal alone with their own political 
instability.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
Review
As NATO emerges from the political tensions of the
Cold War, it seems clear that the organization faces new 
and more far-reaching challenges for European security. 
Created during a time of political distrust and 
suspicion, NATO was very much a product of calculated 
Cold War strategy. To some, NATO is now a soldier 
without a war to fight.
In Chapter Two this study examined some of the 
potential historical reasons for the Cold War and 
outlined the creation of and reason for NATO's 
existence. This chapter also examined the structure of 
NATO with emphasis on the collective defense command 
structure. Chapters Three and Four have endeavored to 
examine the political environment in which NATO now 
finds itself as well the two main political paths that 
NATO now faces. While the expansion of NATO eastward is
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now a foregone conclusion with the admittance of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and future enlargement 
seems certain,^ there are still arguments being made 
that expansion is a bad political move for NATO and its 
member states.
As this study has endeavored to demonstrate, NATO 
enlargement has important consequences for European 
security as well as European political stability. As 
Europe's principal defense organization, NATO's internal 
stability and cohesion can have a significant impact on 
the security of Europe. Furthermore, NATO's continued 
viability as a successful intergovernmental institution 
seems likely to play a major role in the progress of 
Central and Eastern European fledgling democracies. The 
arguments outlined in this study have all found basis in 
enlargement's likely impact on NATO and on the security 
of Europe. While scholars on both sides of the 
enlargement issue agree that the advancement of 
democracy in Eastern Europe is a good thing, and that 
the continued effectiveness of NATO is essential, they 
still disagree on what effects enlargement is really 
going to have on NATO and Europe.
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Arguments in Favor of Expansion 
Perhaps the most prominent of the arguments in 
favor of the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is the by so doing, political stability 
will be "exported" to Eastern Europe. As these 
countries are only recently emerging from underneath the 
thumb of Soviet domination, they are experiencing the 
bittersweet pill of sovereign responsibility. 
Specifically, countries like Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia are, compared to their Western European 
neighbors, experiencing serious political instability 
accompanied with rapid liberal democratic reform. After 
years of authoritarian rule, these countries are trying 
to establish firm civilian control over the military, 
protect the rights of minorities within their borders 
(particularly in the Baltic states), ensure overall 
respect for basic human rights, and, at the same time, 
convert their economies to a competitive market-
orientation.
In order for these countries to complete this 
transition to true democracy, many believe that NATO
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needs to extend its umbrella of military and political 
protection to these countries. Moreover, it is 
difficult to ignore the fact that political stability in 
East and Central Europe helps to ensure continued peace 
and security in Western Europe. As German Defense 
Minister Volker Ruhe asserted, "if we do not export 
stability, we shall import instability.""
Furthermore, as NATO has served to prevent open 
conflict from erupting between such rival countries as 
Greece and Turkey, it is hoped that NATO can prevent the 
nationalization of defense policies and resulting 
military conflicts by expanding to include the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. As stated earlier, such 
political analysts as Jane Sharp have pointed out that 
today the nations of Western Europe do not even 
"contemplate settling disputes between themselves by 
force.""' This is clearly a political reality that 
Western Europe would like to see extended into Eastern 
Europe.̂
Last, as NATO transforms itself from a strictly 
collective defense organization to a cooperative 
security organization, enlargement becomes a more
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Arguments Against NATO Expansion
Perhaps the most prominent of the arguments against
the eastward expansion is the reaction it has elicited 
from Russia. Specifically, since the final days of 
Mikhail Gorbachev through the administrations of Boris 
Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, Russia has become more and 
more averse to the prospect of continuing NATO (Western) 
expansion into its former sphere of influence.
Although it seemed as though Russia would pursue a 
very "West-friendly" Atlanticist foreign policy during 
the first few years of the 1990s, by 1993, Russian 
president Boris Yeltsin was warning of a "Cold Peace" 
should the West continue to extend its sphere of 
influence east at the possible expense of Russian 
interests. Although Russians are still dependent upon 
Western foreign aid, they have made it clear that NATO's 
continued pursuit of expansion may risk the relative 
good relations that currently exist between themselves 
and the West.
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The Russian resistance to NATO enlargement is 
important for a couple of reasons. One, NATO expansion 
represents the failure of Russian policy vis-a-vis the 
near abroad countries of Eastern and Central Europe—  
namely those that have already been admitted into NATO. 
Specifically, after the Soviet breakup, the Russians had 
hoped to be the political leader of the former Warsaw 
Treaty member states. When this leadership role failed 
to occur, it represented a severe blow to Russian pride.
Furthermore, NATO expansion eastward symbolizes the 
fact that Russian political power really ends at the 
eastern border of Ukraine. As NATO and the West become 
more politically important to Eastern and Central 
Europe, Russia becomes less important politically.
These defeats for Russian policy have all contributed to 
a Russian inferiority complex that some believe only 
exacerbates political and economic instability.
By enlarging, NATO also runs the risk of becoming 
too cumbersome. While consensus was difficult enough to 
achieve with the original twelve members and later
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sixteen members, the addition of three more members 
could potentially cause the NATO member states to be 
less able to agree with one another— particularly given 
the absence of the external Soviet threat that helped to 
hold the organization together for more than forty 
years.
Last, if NATO is to expand eastward with the intent 
of "exporting" stability through the encouragement of 
democratic and free-market values, it must successfully 
develop a plan for dealing with the states seeking 
admission, but will not be admitted in the near future. 
While many of these states are working to institute 
democratic reforms in the hopes of being invited to join 
NATO, if such an invitation is not forthcoming, reforms 
may stall, resulting in further political problems.
NATO and the Future 
Despite the provocative warning of George F. Kennan 
that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of 
American policy in the entire post-Cold War era,the 
potential benefits of enlargement would seem to outweigh 
the possible risks. While the benefits of enlargement 
should become apparent as the enlargement process
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continues and begins to really work, the risks 
associated with enlargement can be dealt with through 
careful planning and diplomatic discourse. For example, 
the basis for Russian opposition to NATO enlargement 
rests with their exclusion from the Alliance. Russian 
fears of enlargement would undoubtedly be allayed if 
only the member countries of NATO would hold out the 
possibility of potential Russian membership. This 
strategy would seem also applicable to any of the other 
Eastern European countries not currently being added to 
NATO membership. Although the problem of consensus is 
still a valid argument against expansion, it would seem 
to be a small price to pay for the possibility of 
European military and political unity under the flag of 
NATO.
Few would have predicted in 194 9 that NATO would 
prove to be as successful as it has been. Indeed, many 
military analysts, including Dwight Eisenhower, believed 
in 1949 that if American forces were still in Europe in 
the mid 1950s helping to provide for its security, the 
efforts of NATO would have been in vain.'' On numerous 
occasions during its history, NATO experienced upheavals
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that many believed could have unraveled the Alliance. 
Examples of these upheavals include the French 
withdrawal from the joint military command in the 1960s, 
as well as the Euro-missile crisis of the 1980s.̂  When 
the process of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 
began, "many analysts again raised the specter of 
destabilization.
Despite these and other difficulties, however, NATO 
has endured and grown strong. Although NATO was 
originally constructed as a defensive military alliance 
in the strictest sense of the term, it has continued to 
survive despite the loss of its foe--contrary to the 
predictions of those in the camp of political realism. 
NATO's continued existence and growth in power, in fact, 
suggest that a greater and deeper connection exists 
between the member states.
Despite the warnings of such political scholars as 
George F. Kennan and others, NATO enlargement seems to 
offer many potential benefits for both itself as well as 
Europe overall. While Russia has reacted very strongly 
to NATO enlargement as it is currently conceived, Russia 
seems less likely to be politically upset if membership
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within the Alliance were seen to be possible. Similarly,
the problem of exclusion only exists so long as some
countries are admitted while others are left outside the
organization with no hope of acceptance.
According the Charles Philippe David, if it is
supposed that the underpinnings of NATO's success extend
beyond military reasons, then the future for NATO
prosperity seems bright. He offers the following
observation :
[first] existing members and aspiring members 
alike want the benefit of belonging to the 
hegemonic political camp. Second, the Alliance's 
high level of institutionalization yields 
benefits in terms of continental stability, 
conflict prevention and management, and 
coordination of national security policies.
These benefits go well beyond geopolitical 
considerations. Lastly, NATO reflects the 
existence of a community of nations which share 
democratic values, practice consultation and 
collective decision making, and wish to increase 
the attraction of these values and 
practices...[this] approach offers a more useful 
perspective than realism not only on the 
justification for NATO's survival and enlargement 
but indeed on strengthening security in Europe.
For now, it seems likely that NATO will continue to 
expand eastward as it attempts to promote stability 
there, and achieve the development of a broader 
framework for European security. This study has
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endeavored to flesh out the arguments both for and 
against enlargement not necessarily to prove that one 
path is necessarily better than the other, but rather to 
help promote understanding of the issues on both sides. 
For example, even though Russia is currently opposed to 
NATO expansion eastward, this position could change if 
NATO were to consider seriously Russia for NATO 
membership.^' Indeed, most scholars agree that if NATO 
is to survive in the long-term as an institution 
spreading a "liberal vision" it cannot forever exclude 
Russia.
The idea of a united Europe is not a new one.
While military conquerors like Charlemagne, Napoleon, 
Hitler, and even Stalin envisioned a Europe united by 
means of force and oppression, the potential unification 
of Europe by peaceful, voluntary, and liberal means is 
indeed a new idea, and is now a real possibility. If 
NATO^s success at unifying its members in a common 
purpose to this point is any indication, and if NATO 
continues its program of expansion to include Central 
and Eastern Europe, the future for European peace and 
unity is promising.
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